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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
In addition to the issues raised by the Plaintiffs, the following issues require 
appellate review: 
A. Additional Issues. 
1. What is the applicable standard of review of the district court's denial of 
attorney's fees and costs? Plaintiffs contend that the standard is "correctness." 
However, the Defendants contend that the applicable standard of review is "abuse of 
discretion." See Barker v. Utah Public Service Comm., 970 P.2d 702, 707 (Utah 1998) 
(internal citations omitted). If "abuse of discretion" is the correct standard, Plaintiffs 
failed to marshal the evidence and their appeal is fatally defective. West Valley City v. 
Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App 1991). 
2. Is Plaintiffs' claim barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA)? 
This is an issue of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 
(Utah 1994). 
3. Does the County Land Use Development and Management Act (CLUDMA), 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 et. seq., entitle a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees 
and costs? This is an issue of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
B. Preservation of Issues. 
1 
The County preserved these issues in the court below when it filed Salt Lake 
County's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs, (R. at 
3476-3501). The Plaintiffs' final operative pleading, Corrected Amended Complaint, 
dated March 31, 1998, (R. at 2653-2657), did not seek attorney's fees and costs. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following statutes govern the claim for fees and costs: 
1. Claims seeking awards of money against governmental entities are governed by 
the the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.1 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 
etseq. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 provided: 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or 
damages against a governmental entity or against an employee... 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political 
subdivisions as defined in this chapter. 
2. The Act specifically retained immunity for governmental activities involving 
the exercise of a discretionary function and actions relating to the issuance or revocation 
of licenses and permits. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 provided: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out 
of: 
1
 The cited provisions have remained substantially unchanged before and since the 
Plaintiffs' litigation here. 
2 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is 
abused... 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny suspend, or revoke any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
3. Plaintiffs' suit was based on the provisions of CLUDMA. Utah Code Ann. § 
17-27-1002. Enforcement. 
(l)(a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real estate within the 
county in which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under 
the authority of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in 
addition to other remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or other appropriate 
actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful 
building, use, or act. 
(2)(a) The county may enforce the ordinance by withholding building 
permits. 
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter or change 
the use of any building or other structure within a county without 
approval of a building permit. 
(c) The county may not issue a building permit unless the plans 
of and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, 
alteration, or use fully conform to all regulations then in effect. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In their Corrected Amended Complaint (R. at 2653-2657), Plaintiffs challenged the 
County's land-use decisions and prayed that those decisions be set aside, that the building 
pemiits and certificate of occupancy be declared null and void, and that they be awarded 
reasonable access to their two residential properties. They prevailed on these claims, with 
3 
this court holding that their claims were viable under CLUDMA. Culbertson v. Bd. of 
County Commissioners, 2001 UT 108, ffi[ 29-31, 44 P.3d 642. In Johnson v. Hermes 
Associates, LTD, 2005 UT 82, 128 P.3d 1151, the Plaintiffs obtained injunctive relief 
against the Hermes defendants (Hermes) requiring Hermes to restore the street in question 
to its original status. 
Although they never sought attorney fees and costs under their Corrected Amended 
Complaint in Culbertson, well after judgment in this matter they filed a motion seeking all 
of the attorney fees and costs they incurred in litigating against the County, the Hennes 
defendants, and certain relatives. (R. at 3177-3446). The Plaintiffs raised a number of 
alternative equitable theories for recovery. The trial court rejected the Plaintiffs' 
alternative theories as not applicable and analyzed their claim under the private attorney 
general doctrine. 
The trial court, employing the test set forth in Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 
P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), found that the evidence they presented did not meet those 
standards and denied their claim. The court found that Plaintiffs' litigation primarily 
benefitted the Plaintiffs' private interests with little to no benefit running to the public. 
(R.at 3588, pg. 22-24; R.at 3571-3572). The court held that this litigation did not benefit 
the public as whole or vindicate a public policy over and above the Plaintiffs' pecuniary 
interests. Id, The trial court pointed to the fact that in Johnson, 2005 UT at ^ 20-25, 
this court specifically found special injuries suffered by the Plaintiffs, further 
demonstrating the vindication of their personal rights rather than their championing of a 
4 
public interest. (R. 3588, pp. 3-4, 9, 22-24). 
The Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's analysis claiming that it mis-applied the 
Stewart test and that it erred in finding that no other attorney fee theory applied to this 
case. They contend that the hearsay evidence of newspaper articles discussing this case 
fulfilled their evidentiary burden of demonstrating the "public interest" in this case. In 
short, they contend that "publicity" accorded an item by a news editor is the equivalent of 
the "public interest." They seek judicial review, therefore, under the more liberal 
standard of "correctness" (Appellant's Brief at p.5), rather than the more proper and 
deferential "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing the trial court's analysis of the 
facts they failed to present to recover under any equitable denied their claim because it 
theory. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This litigation was first filed on July 21, 1995 via a verified complaint. (R. at 1-21). 
That complaint requested the court to set aside any exemptions and invalidate any license 
or permits relating to a commercial development of Hermes (Hermes), and establish 
access to the Plaintiffs' properties. IcL This matter was dismissed on cross motions for 
summary judgment on February 17, 1998. (R. at 2549-2563). Plaintiffs had also 
maintained a parallel litigation directly against Hermes which was also eventually 
dismissed. 
This court consolidated these cases on appeal in Culbertson v. Bd. of County 
5 
Commissioners, 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642, and reversed the trial courts. That decision 
was issued on December 18, 2001. The case involving the County defendants remained 
relatively inactive until March 10, 2006 when the Plaintiffs filed their motion seeking all 
of the expenses they claim they incurred in litigating against the County defendants, 
Hermes, and some relatives. (R at 3177). That motion was the first time the County 
defendants received notice that the Plaintiffs sought monetary claims against them. The 
motion claimed they were entitled to their litigation expenses under the equitable theories 
of the private attorney general doctrine, the third-party litigation rule, and general 
principles of equity. 
After extensive briefing by the parties, the trial court heard oral argument on the motion 
on May 12, 2006. (R at 3588, pp. 1-24). The trial court denied their motion. Id It 
entered findings of facts and conclusions of law on June 5, 2006. (R. at 3569-3573). 
Plaintiffs initiated this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs owned the only two properties on the south side of North Union Avenue and 
Hermes owned the north side. Under their Corrected Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs 
succeeded in unbundling the approval of the Hermes project in Culbertson , 2001 UT 108. 
This court held the Plaintiffs' action viable under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1002. 
Culbertson Tflj 29-31. 
Plaintiffs initiated this action against the Defendants without filing any notice of claim 
6 
or otherwise complying with the provisions of the UGIA. They went directly to the 
district court and sought the rollback of the Hermes project. They did not seek attorney's 
fees and costs until March 10, 2006 when they filed the motion under review. (R.at 3177-
3446). Their failure to file a notice of claim for fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-13 deprives the courts of jurisdiction to entertain this new claim. Nielsen v. 
Gurlev, 880 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah App. 1994). 
Even if the Plaintiffs had complied with the notice provisions, their claim against the 
Defendants is barred by UGIA which retained immunity for the Defendants' decisions 
relating to the Hermes project because such a process involves a discretionary function 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1), and the permit process under Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10(3), for which the Legislature retained immunity. 
The private attorney general doctrine is not applicable for a number of reasons. First, it 
cannot be used to circumvent UGIA. Second, this theory of recovery is not assessable 
against governmental entities absent specific statutory authorization or a waiver of 
immunity. Finally, even if the court extends this doctrine to the Defendants, the Plaintiffs 
still fail. They confused in the court below the concept that "publicity" is the equivalent 
of the "public interest." A celebrity who travels to Africa to give birth has been accorded 
greater publicity than the Plaintiffs and their case, yet her journey furthered no public 
interest. The fact that a news editor elects to run several stories about an event does not 
necessarily elevate that event to public interest status or transform in into an important 
7 
public policy. This suit was not about issues affecting the public at large; it was private 
litigation over the only two properties on the south side of an obscure street and brought 
to vindicate private interests. Other than those involved in the courts, generally no 
average citizen could recite the Plaintiffs' names, identify their suit's issues, or point to 
some benefit that inured to a citizen's property or relationship with County government. 
In fact, the trial court recognized that in order to have obtained the injunction against 
Hennes the Plaintiffs succeeded in showing damages peculiar to themselves. (R. 3588, 
pgs. 3-4, 9, 22-24). More importantly, the Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of the 
sufficient quality and quantity to convince the trial court in its fact-finding analysis that 
their case met the Stewart standards for the award of their attorney fee claim. And, before 
this court, they have failed to marshal that evidence to challenge the trial court's factual 
analysis to secure appellate review and demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in 
not awarding them their attorney fees and costs. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the third-party litigation rule was not applicable. 
Plaintiffs' claims under this theory of recovery are barred by UGIA as discussed above, 
and this theory is not applicable against governmental entities. The trial court also found 
this theory inapplicable in the case at bar because the fees and costs claimed here could 
not be viewed as damages flowing from tort or contract. Additionally, this theory may 
only be used to recover litigation costs incurred with third parties such as against Hermes 
not the costs incurred against the County and not those incurred litigating against 
8 
relatives. Again, the Plaintiffs failed to marshal the evidence to support a challenge to the 
trial court's analysis. 
Finally, this court, in Culbertson, at fflf 29-31, held that the Plaintiffs' action was 
founded upon CLUDMA, which does not provide statutory authorization for an award of 
attorney fees and costs. If the Legislature intended to provide for such a recovery it could 
have done so as it has in numerous other statutes it has enacted. Its decision to omit such 
a recovery for a party prevailing under CLUDMA precludes an end-run by some equitable 
theory. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UGIA BARS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM BECAUSE THEY 
FAILED TO FILE THE NOTICE OF CLAIM AND IMMUNITY IS 
RETAINED FOR THE COUNTY'S PERMITTING PROCESS. 
A. Applicable Standard 
In the court below, the Defendants contended that the Plaintiffs' claim is subject to 
UGIA. The trial court did not accept this argument. Since this issue is a question of law, 
it is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
B. Discussion 
1. Plaintiffs' Failure to Provide Notice of Their Claim Deprives the Courts of 
Jurisdiction. 
At the time of the events underlying this case, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 required 
anyone asserting a claim for money damages to file a notice of claim: 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an 
9 
act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the claim arises, or before the 
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
See: Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11, detailing the contents of a proper notice of claim. 
Plaintiffs filed no notice. 
The filing of the notice is jurisdictional and their failure to file it is fatal: 
The failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act deprives the trial court of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and therefore compliance with the act is a precondition to 
maintaining an action "against the state, or against its employee for 
an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-12(1993). See id. § 63-30-11: Lamarr v. Utah 
State Pep't of Tramp.. 828 P.2d 535. 540-41 (Utah App.1992). In 
Lamarr, we held that a suit against the State cannot be maintained 
unless proper notice is given. 828 P.2d at 542. Moreover, we pointed 
out that because improper notice divests the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction, failure to provide proper notice of claim is a non-
waivable defense that any party, or the court, can raise at any time. Id. 
at 540. 
Nielsen v. Gurlev, 888 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah App.1994). Such notice must be filed before 
maintaining an action. Id. at 136. Accord: Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ffl[ 9-
11, 40 P.3d 632. In the case before this court, because the Plaintiffs never filed the 
requisite notice of their money claim for attorney fees and costs before filing their suit, 
their claim is barred. 
10 
2. Defendants are Immune for Activities Relating to the Licensing/Permitting of the 
Hermes Project. 
This court employs a three-step analysis of governmental immunity claims. Lanev v. 
Fairview City, 2002 UT 79,1 11, 57 P.3d 1007. First, the court determines if the activity 
under review is a governmental function. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) immunizes 
governmental functions, which are broadly defined to include any "act" or "failure to act" 
whether governmental, proprietary, and whether unique or essential or core to a 
governmental function. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a). The Defendants' activities 
relating to the permitting of the Hermes project are uniquely governmental actions as they 
cannot be performed in the private sector. Second, the court determines if the Act has 
waived blanket immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 for injuries proximately 
caused by the negligent act or omission of a governmental employee. The Plaintiffs 
showed that the Defendants' permitting actions were erroneous. Finally, the court returns 
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 to determine if the Legislature retained immunity for the 
claim at issue. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3) retained immunity for any injury arising 
out of "the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by failure or refusal to issue, 
deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization." The courts have consistently recognized this retained immunity. 
In Metropolitan Fin. Co., v. State, 714 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986), the state issued two 
certificates of title to a vehicle. Another party somehow obtained the first title, secured 
from the state a fraudulent title showing him as the owner, and used that title as collateral 
11 
for a loan on which he defaulted. The lender sued the state because it had advanced the 
loan on the strength of the fraudulent title. This court upheld immunity for the state: 
... We need only observe that the statutory waiver of immunity 
for negligence does not apply when plaintiffs alleged injury 
arises out of the issuance of title certificates or the 
misrepresentations or omissions of defendants' employees. 
Immunity from suit... is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee ... 
except if the injury: 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or 
revocation of... any permit, license, certificate, approval, 
order, or similar authorization; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee 
whether or not it is negligent or intentional; 
S 63-30-10aXcUfl (emphasis added). Plaintiffs allegations 
of negligence and conspiracy are clearly circumscribed within 
these two statutory exceptions to any immunity waiver. 
Therefore, even assuming that the facts alleged by plaintiff are 
true, the Governmental Immunity Act does not waive immunity 
from suit for the negligent or intentional performance by 
defendants of these governmental functions. The summary 
judgment against plaintiff is affirmed. 
Id. at 293. 
In DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1999), the purchasers of an office building 
sought damages against the county for the negligent inspection of the building and for the 
"fraudulent issuance of the temporary occupancy permit for the building," because the 
contractor had misrepresented information to the building inspector to secure the permit. 
Id. at 430. The County would not finalize the occupancy and actually ordered the 
12 
purchasers to vacate the building. This court dismissed their claims because immunity 
had been retained under two subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(3) (activities 
relating to the issuance of permits and licenses or other authorizations) and (4) (activities 
regarding inspections). DeBry at 441. This court relied on Gilman v. Dept. of Fin. 
Institutions, 782 P.2d 506, 512-513 (Utah 1989), which had held there was no liability for 
the "negligent or wrongful issuance or revocation of licenses and permits." 
In Butler. Crockett and Walsh Develop. Corp., v. Salt Lake County, 205 WL 2303808 
(UT App 2005) (unpublished) (copy attached), the plaintiffs sued over the denial of a 
conditional use permit. The court found the County's action a protected activity under the 
UGIA relating to the issuance of permits and licenses. 
Courts have also recognized that immunity extends to licensing and permitting 
decisions under the immunity retained for discretionary functions under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(4). See: Wilcox v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 484 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Utah 1971) 
(waitresses' suit for denial/renewal of work permits based upon wrongful reviews of 
waitresses' chest x-rays barred by discretionary function immunity); Seal v. Mapleton 
City. 598 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1979) (governmental function immunity protected city's 
failure to approve subdivision plan); and D.C.A. Develop. Corp., v. Ogden City Mun. 
Corp., 965 F.2d 827 (10th Cir.1992) (discretionary function exception under state law 
immunized city's refusal to issue occupancy permit before expiration of favorable tax 
treatment program for development). 
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In Loveland v. Orem City Corp.. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), this court held that the 
actions of the city council and planning commission in analyzing land-use decisions are 
uniquely governmental in nature and retained immunity. The court found that the 
commission's receipt, analysis, and approval of the plat, the council's review and 
approval of the plat, and the commission's failure to require the project to fence the canal 
within the subdivision and in which the plaintiffs child fell and drowned were 
immunized under "the governmental function " exception to the Act's waiver of 
immunity. Id. at 775-776. And in Bennett v. Bow Valley Develop. Corp.. 797 P.2d 1419 
(Utah 1990), this court, relying on Loveland, supra, held that the city's activities relating 
to its inspection and acceptance of a subdivision project and releasing the bond were 
protected by governmental immunity, even though the homeowners claimed that the city 
wrongfully released the developer's bond and that the city commission had colluded with 
the developer by withholding information of the unstable ground conditions that caused 
the homeowners' damages. Id. at 422-423 . 
In the case at bar, the Defendants' actions surrounding the Hermes project may 
be characterized as erroneous or wrongful and have been undone by the courts as 
requested by the Plaintiffs. However, their claim for money to reimburse them for their 
litigation costs is barred because they did not file the requisite notice of claim. It is barred 
by the retention of immunity for discretionary activities and the decisions relating to the 
permitting of the Hermes project. Plaintiffs cannot turn their claim for setting aside those 
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actions into money damages by seeking their costs of litigation. They cannot indirectly 
secure a monetary award through equity which they could not have directly accomplished 
under UGIA. 
POINT II. THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL THEORY IS NOT 
APPLICABLE. 
A. Applicable Standard 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly applied the private attorney 
general doctrine and they seek review of the correctness of that ruling. However, the trial 
court's decision whether to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Shipman v. Evans. 2004 UT 44, }^25, 100 P.3d 1151. 
B. Discussion 
The trial court analyzed the Plaintiffs claim under the private attorney general 
doctrine recognized by this court in Stewart v. Public Serv. Common,, 888 P.2d 759 (Utah 
1994). Stewart, relying on Serrano v. Priest, 141 Cal. Rpt. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (CA 
1977), held that the ratepayers' attorney fees could be recovered under a common fund or 
private attorney general theory, because their suit set aside the Public Service 
Commission's rate of return, established the unconstitutionality of a state statute, created 
a multi-million dollar refund for the benefit of all ratepayers in the state, and vindicated 
an important public policy that benefitted all ratepayers in the state. Stewart, supra at 
783-784. On remand, the commission made its attorney fee award out of that common 
fund, which this court affirmed. Barker, supra. 970 P.2d 702, 708. 
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The trial court, exercising its discretion, Shipman. 2004 UT at |25, reviewed the 
record and the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs and concluded that they had not met 
their burden to recover under this doctrine. The Defendants urge this court to sustain the 
trial court's ruling under several independent grounds. First, the trial court rejected 
recovery under this theory not by misapplying the test, but because Plaintiffs' evidence 
was insufficient; that is, they did not meet their burden of proof. Second, the private 
attorney general doctrine should not be employed to circumvent UGIA, especially as that 
doctrine for recovering litigation costs has not enjoyed wide acceptance by courts and 
invades the province of the Legislature. 
1. The trial court correctly applied the Stewart test and did not abuse its discretion 
in rejecting Plaintiffs' claim. 
Plaintiffs assert in their brief that the private attorney general doctrine has 
developed in Utah into a three-part test- whether a strong or societally important public 
policy is vindicated, the plaintiffs costs transcend the plaintiffs pecuniary interest, and 
the case is extraordinary. (Appellants' brief at 18). They use this assertion to contend 
that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in analyzing their claim. Contrary to 
that assertion, in Shipman at fflf 23-25, this court expounded on the private attorney 
general doctrine: 
Among the methods of granting an equitable award of attorney 
fees is a doctrine known as the "private attorney general." Under 
this doctrine, "[c]ourts... have awarded attorney fees to a party as a 
'private attorney general' when the 'vindication of a strong or 
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societally important public policy' takes place and the necessary 
costs in doing so 'transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary 
interest to an extent requiring subsidization.'" Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783 
(quoting Serrano v. Priest. 20 Cal.3d 25. 141 Cal. Rptr. 315. 569 P.2d 
1303. 1314 (1977fl. 
Awards of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine 
are dispensed sparingly. In Stewart, we awarded attorney fees under 
the doctrine but "note[d] the exceptional nature of [that] case. We 
further note[d] that any future award of attorney fees under this 
doctrine [would] take an equally extraordinary case." Id. at 783 n.19. 
In that case, we applied an extremely high standard - that "but for" 
plaintiffs' action, the ill could not have been cured. 
In this case, the trial court determined that plaintiffs were not 
entitled to an equitable award of fees under the private attorney general 
theory, concluding that plaintiffs' lawsuit did not vindicate a societally 
important public policy and that the remedy sought was achieved 
via initiative, not court order. Because we review this holding under 
an abuse of discretion standard, we will not undertake our own 
assessment of whether plaintiffs vindicated a public policy, nor will we 
attempt to gauge anew the importance of any vindicated policy, nor will 
we tackle the question of whether plaintiffs' actions were comparable 
to those we found "extraordinary" in Stewart. Instead, we review the 
trial court's determination that an equitable reward was not merited 
here only to see if the trail court abused its discretion. We hold that it did not. 
(Emphasis supplied). Even if this holding is construed into a three-part test, the Plaintiffs 
did not meet their burden in the trial court to recover under this theory. 
In the case at bar, the trial court employed the Stewart test: "Stewart says, 'Courts 
have awarded attorney's fees to a party as a Private Attorney General when vindication of 
a strong or society (sic) important public policy takes place and the necessary costs of 
doing so, transcends the individual's pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidation 
(sic)...'" (R.3588, p. 23). The trial court also explained that had the Plaintiffs obtained an 
17 
injunction that changed government's review of developments and the requirements 
relating to setbacks and roadways, the doctrine might apply, but it specifically found that: 
"...the specific relief they (Plaintiffs) got in this case really only benefits them as owners 
of the property. That's where I'm drawing the line." (Id at p. 9). The trial court 
specifically found that "the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation sought and obtained 
relief for their 'special injury,' not for vindication of a broad public interest." (R. at 3571, 
finding 7). The trial court made its findings and rulings after stating: "I have read all the 
memos that have been submitted with respect to this motion. I've read most of the 
cases." (Id. at p. 1). The court considered the facts and theories advanced by the 
Plaintiffs in their motion and supporting memorandum, and found that they did not meet 
the Stewart standards. On appeal, Plaintiffs urge this court to do what it would not do in 
Shipman: perform its own assessment of whether Plaintiffs vindicated a public policy, re-
evaluate the importance of any vindicated public policy, and independently assess 
whether this case is "extraordinary." Id. ^ 25. 
In their brief before this court, Plaintiffs attempt to expand the private attorney 
general doctrine to include additional elements: "...to encourage potential private litigants 
to assert rights embodying important public interests that, due to the costs of litigation, 
might otherwise go unenforced..." and to provide "...an incentive to encourage parties to 
enter into certain litigation affecting public interests," and they assert that the court 
"must inquire into the party's pre-litigation motivations." (Appellants' Brief at 19-20) 
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(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
There are four basic flaws with the Plaintiffs' contentions. First, their reliance on 
the federal cases cited is unhelpful, as the attorney fee awards were predicated upon 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 of the Civil Rights Act wherein Congress specifically elected to authorize 
the courts to make fee awards. As even the Plaintiffs acknowledge, the United States 
Supreme Court refused to adopt the private attorney general doctrine as a part of federal 
common law. Aleyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y. 421 U.S. 240, 247, 
270 n.46 (1975). Second, the California cases cited by Plaintiffs suffer the same 
deficiencies as that state's legislature elected to codify the doctrine in its Code of Civil 
Procedure § 1021.5, effective January 1, 1978, which restricts those courts' discretion 
whether to make an award under the doctrine. Third, the Utah courts have not expanded 
the doctrine to encompass other policy grounds such as a "catalyst" theory or to 
"encourage litigation." In fact, Utah has restricted the theory: 
However, in Stewart we recognized an exception to the traditional rule and held 
that an equitable award of attorney fees was proper under the private attorney 
general doctrine, which allows for an award of fees where a plaintiff successfully 
vindicates an important public policy benefitting a larger population. See Stewart. 
885P.2dat783. 
Faust v. KAI Technologies. Inc.. 2000 UT 82, If 18, 15 P.3d 1266. Fourth, Plaintiffs did 
not raise these alternative grounds in the court below, precluding judicial review. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde. 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 1996). 
They must also convince this court that by vindicating their own rights, an event 
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which occurs in each and every lawsuit where one party prevails no matter how protracted 
or contentious the litigation, that society in general has benefitted. They assert that their 
interests are equal to those of the citizenry at large in order to meet the theory's test for 
recovery. By its nature, this theory is not applicable to the facts of this case. 
In fact, our courts have drawn the private attorney general theory of recovery so 
narrowly that it excludes the plaintiffs' recovery here: 
"'However, in the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, 
a court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees 
when it deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity.'" Id. 
(quoting Stewart v. Public Serv. Comm fn. 886 P.2d 759. 782 (Utah 
1994)). 
Among the methods of granting an equitable award of attorney 
fees [recognized in Utah] is a doctrine known as the "private 
attorney general." Under this doctrine, "[c]ourts ... have awarded 
attorney fees to a party as a 'private attorney general' when the 
'vindication of a strong or societally important public policy' takes 
place and the necessary costs in doing so 'transcend the individual 
plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization.'" 
Shipman v. Evans. 2004 UT 44. ^  23, 100 P.2d 1151 (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted). However, fees awarded under this 
doctrine are not only unusual, but they are awarded only in 
extraordinary cases. See id. at U 24. 
Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Comm'n, 2005 UT App. 347, 
f 6, 121 P.3d 39. The trial court employed this test and found that the Plaintiffs' suit did 
not vindicate an important public policy and their costs did not transcend their own 
interests. In fact, the court specifically found that the case primarily benefitted themselves 
(90%) and not primarily the public (10%). R. at 3588, p. 23; 3569, pp. 3-4). 
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In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs' suit did not create a public fund against which to 
assess fees and costs. Their suit vindicated their rights, but no one else's. It did not benefit 
a "larger population." They did not show that their victory transcended their individual 
pecuniary interest requiring subsidization. They did not serve as the sole representatives of 
a vindicated public interest. Their contention that by setting aside the Defendants' land use 
decisions in this case they have benefitted the public at large because their suit forced 
public officials to account for actions outside the law is not sufficient to award them their 
litigation expenses. See Van Emmerik v. Montana Dakota Util. Co.. 332 N.W.2d 279, 284 
(South Dakota 1983) (rejecting "extra-statutory award" of attorney fees "for redress of a 
public wrong"). The fact that several local papers reported on the case did not supply the 
trial court with that quality of evidence demonstrating this case arose to a public policy or 
public interest. Plaintiffs' failure to marshal the trial court's factual findings and to 
demonstrate their inadequacy to support its conclusions precludes judicial review. West 
Valley Citv.supra. 818 P.2d at 1313. 
2. The Private Attorney General Doctrine Enjoys Limited Judicial Acceptance 
Further Supporting the Trial Court's Findings And Conclusions Denying any 
Award. 
Stewart relied on Serrano v. Priest 141 Cal. Rpt. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (CA 1977), 
for the private attorney general theory of attorney fee recovery, a doctrine that has 
generally been rejected by other courts. See State Board of Tax Comm 'n v. Town St. John. 
751 N.E.2 657, 658 (Ind. 2001) (refusing to recognize private attorney general exception in 
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tax payer's challenge to state's property tax scheme); New Mexico Right to Choose-
NARAL v. Johnson, 982 P.2d 450, 458 (N.M. 1999) (refusing to adopt private attorney 
general doctrine for successful challenge of abortion restrictions); Pearson v. Bd. of Health 
of Chicopee. 525 N.E.2 400, 402 (Mass. 1988) (surveying other states' approaches to the 
theory and refusing to award fees to taxpayers prevailing under open meeting law), and 
Aleyeska. supra at 421 US 270 n.46 (refusing to adopt attorney fee award by judicial 
decree).2 
More importantly, this court has recently held: 
<J 24 We have previously recognized that "[t]he term 'public 
policy' is inherently not subject to precise definition." Berube 
v. Fashion Centre, Ltd,. 771 P.2d 1033. 1042 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
Petermann v. Int'lBhd. Of Teamsters. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184. 188, 
344P.2d25(1659)): see also Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280. 
1282 (Utah 1992). Although public policy eludes attempts at precise 
definition, it may be understood as a matter of such fundamental 
concern to society that the right of individuals to order their affairs 
by contract may yield to society's interest in preserving or 
advancing the matter. Constitutions and statutes are often the source 
of public policy. Id_ Sometimes, statutes contain purposeful legislative 
expressions of public policy. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann § 53A-12-102 
(2002) ("It is public policy of this state that public education shall be 
2Although Defendants have not attempted to list all states' decisions, the following 
cases show in the inapplicability of the private attorney general doctrine: Shelby County 
Comm'n. v. Smith. 372 So.2d 1092, 1097 (Alabama 1979) (no award even though 
plaintiffs' suit brought wide-spread salary adjustment); Hamer v. Kirk. 64 111.2d 434, 356 
N.E.2d 524, 526-527 (no fee award absence creation of common fund in tax payer class 
action); Okla. Tax Comm'n. v. Rick. 888 P.2d 1336, 1339-1340 (Okla. 1994) (fees 
awarded only if common fund created in direct supervision and control of court); Jones v. 
Muir. 511 Pa. 535, 515 A.2d 855, 860 (1986) (doctrine only available through legislative 
authorization); and Providence Journal Co. v. Mason. 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976) 
(rejecting fee award in employment discrimination claim). 
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free."). It is important to note, however, that "[t]his does not mean that 
all statements made in a statute are expressions of public policy." 
Browning. 832 P.2d at 1282. Just as not every statutory enactment 
rises to the level of public policy, conduct that falls short of strict 
compliance with a statute may not always constitute the type of public 
policy transgression sufficient to warrant intervention in a private 
contractual relationships. 
Lee v. Thorpe. 2006 UT 66, f 24, 147 P.3d 443. 
Plaintiffs request this court to second guess the trial judge's findings that this suit 
failed to implicate sufficient public policies warranting a fee award. The trial court's 
caution was well founded, for under the Plaintiffs' theory, attorney fees recovery would be 
implicated in every suit involving government. That is why the majority of courts that have 
examined the theory have rejected it outright or have limited its application to those cases 
where a common fund was created which inured to the benefit of the citizenry at large and 
the suit did not vindicate the litigants' financial rights. Retention of the doctrine under the 
common fund theory makes sense where the underlying suit created a fund benefitting the 
public at large while vindicating an important public policy, rather than simply according 
the trial court such broad discretion to circumvent the American rule that each party bears 
its own litigation costs in the absence of statute or contract. This approach harmonizes this 
court's pronouncements in Stewart and Faust, and extends a zone of comfort to the trial 
courts and society that a fund was created from which to make an award. 
In the case at bar, plaintiffs have vindicated their own interests and no more. The 
trial court's findings, which Plaintiffs have not challenged, that 90% of the benefits of this 
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litigation inured to the Plaintiffs and only 10% benefitted the public, were actually too 
liberal a finding in favor of a public benefit. The Plaintiffs have not pointed to any 
specific, definable public benefit generated by this litigation outside of broad general 
statements which did not meet their evidentiary burden before the court. No other 
neighbors received a benefit from the Plaintiffs' actions here. Accepting their theory 
creates a dangerous and unworkable premise that any time a citizen prevails against a 
governmental entity, litigation costs should be awarded, whether the challenged decisions 
relate to animal licenses, the thickness of sheet rock in new projects, side-yard and set-back 
provisions. That approach cannot be the standard for circumventing UGIA. Here, 
plaintiffs' actions did not confer a substantial benefit to any ascertainable class of County 
citizens. Their suit created no fund at all, let alone a fund benefitting others. The relief 
they sought and gained from the court only benefitted themselves. Under the private 
attorney general theory as a basic concept, and even under the Utah cases, their claim and 
their evidentiary support do not justify an award of attorney fees and costs against the 
Defendants. 
POINT III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM THAT ATTORNEY FEES BE 
AWARDED UNDER GENERAL EQUITY PRINCIPLES IS BARRED 
BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE UPON 
WHICH THE COURT RELIED IN EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION, 
AND THE OTHER THEORIES OF RECOVERY ARE INAPPLICABLE. 
A. Applicable Standard. 
The trial court's ruling is reviewed under an abuse fo discretion. Shipman, 
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2004 U n 25. 
B. Discussion. 
Plaintiffs complain that the trial court should have awarded them their litigation 
expenses under general principles of equity, particularly relying on Jensen v. Bowcut 892 
P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995). Plaintiffs have not marshaled the trial court's findings 
supporting its decision and demonstrated that the court abused its discretion. 
Moreover, Bowcut is not helpful here. As the court recognized in upholding an 
award of fees: 
...Similar to the examples set forth above, Jensen expended her time and 
resources for the benefit of another-in this case, for the support of a minor. We 
believe that under these circumstances equity demands the award of attorney fees. 
Moreover, the award of fees in this case was, in reality, simply a part of the child 
support award itself since the fees went to reimburse Jensen for her "support" of 
David. 
Id. at 1058-1059. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs' suit is not based on their financing of 
another person whose support should have been provided by the defendant. 
Their reliance on Cafferty v. Hughes. 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d 233 , cert, granted 
56 P.3d 603 (2002), is misplaced. In that case the court of appeals upheld the fee award 
because the beneficiary's suit against the trustee obtained a recovery for all of the 
beneficiaries of the trust. 2002 UT App at f 23-24. This court reviewed the attorney fee 
award and concluded that the trail court properly awarded fees because: "Indeed, the 
litigation resulted in the recapture of substantial funds to the trust estate, which benefitted 
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all beneficiaries." Hughes v. Cafferty. 2004 UT 22, If 30, 89 P.3d 148. The court 
recognized that even if a prevailing party falls within one of the categories for equitable 
recovery of attorney fees, it is not necessarily entitled to an award, icL at f 22, fn. 1, 
because the trial court has "considerable latitude and discretion" in supplying and 
formulating an equitable remedy, id. at ^ 20 (internal citations and quotations omitted), and 
it need "not adhere to a rigid analysis." Id at [^ 31. 
In the case at bar, the trial court, in its discretion, analyzed the alternative theories 
and concluded they were not applicable, as the Plaintiffs were not seeking contractual or 
tort damages, see Macris & Associates v. Neways, Inc.. 2002 UT App 406, fflf 13-14, 60 
P.3d 1176, and they had not pled for a fee award . (R.3588 at pp. 4-5). And, Plaintiffs pled 
themselves out from recovering under the third-party litigation theory when they sought 
fees for their suits against these Defendants, Hermes, and their relatives, Macris , 2002 at ^ 
K 19-2031, when that theory may only allow recovery of fees incurred in litigating against 
third parties. 
POINT IV. PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY CLUDMA. 
A. Applicable Standard 
The issue is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, Supra 869. P.2d at 939. 
B. Discussion. 
Plaintiffs' claims are also barred by the procedures and relief provided by the Utah 
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County Land Use Development and Management Act [CLUDMA]3. The Plaintiffs 
challenged the County's enforcement of its land-use decisions, and this court held that they 
prevailed under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1002. Culberston. 2001 UT 1 0 8 , ^ 2 9 - 3 1 . T h u s> 
the Plaintiffs' suit against these Defendants must be viewed within the framework of Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-1002, which allows injunction, abatement, mandamus, and other 
remedies for reversing the erroneous land-use decision, but specifically omits awards of the 
costs of litigation. 
Where it has so desired, the Legislature has provided for the award of attorney fees: 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(7)(b)(v) (2002) (bad checks); § 30-1-17 and 18 (1988) 
(mechanics' liens); § 76-6-412(2)( 1997) (treble damages and fees for theft); § 58-1 la-
503(5) (2001) (penalties against barbers and cosmetologists); § 78-36-10(3)(1994) 
(forcible entry and detainer); and § 63-30d-903(l) (2004) (government employee's 
recovery of attorney fees and costs for failed prosecution), a non-exhaustive list. 
If the Legislature had intended to give such an aggrieved party the right to recover 
attorney fees and costs when successfully challenging a land-use decision, it would have 
expressly so provided. It is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction that"... the 
expression of one [thing] should be interpreted as the exclusion of another." Sorenson's 
Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354, f 11, 36 P.3d 528 (quoting Biddle v. 
3CLUDMA (see U.C.A. Iffi 17-27-101, et. seq) was superceded by the enactment of the 
Local Land Use Amendments [LLUDMA] by the 2005 Utah Legislature (SB60). The version of 
provision of CLUDMA quoted herein was in effect during the time period relevant to this case, 
and had last been amended in 1991. 
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Washington Terrace City. 1999 UT 110,1(14, 993 P.2d 875). In the case of CLUDMA, the 
Legislature provided for various forms of equitable relief, but conspicuously did not 
provide for recovery of attorney fees. 
It is clear that at the time the purported "cause of action" arose against the County, 
the legislature had not seen fit to provide a right for an aggrieved citizen to recover attorney 
fees in challenging a county land-use decision. Nor had the Salt Lake County Commission 
provided by ordinance under the authority of CLUDMA an express right for a disgruntled 
citizen to recover attorney fees in an administrative challenge, even though the County 
could have expressly so provided if it so elected. 
These specific expressions of legislative intent trump the plaintiffs5 vague assertions 
of "equity" and "vindication of public policy" under their theories of recovery. Even the 
state's organic sources for the land-use decision making process and challenges to that 
process undercut the Plaintiffs' claims for reimbursement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' claim for fees and costs is fatally flawed. There is no statutory basis 
for such an award and the Legislature specifically omitted the recovery of litigation 
expenses for successful challenges of land-use decisions. Without legislative authority, a 
court may not assess fees and costs against a governmental entity. The Plaintiffs never 
sought fees and costs as part of their suit but sought to overturn the County's land-use 
decisions. 
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Their money "claim" falls within the ambit of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. They failed to comply with its provisions- they never filed a notice of claim, depriving 
the courts of jurisdiction. Moreover, the Legislature retained immunity for a governmental 
entity's actions relating to the discretionary function of land-use activities and for the 
activities surrounding any permit process. 
Their private attorney general theory in untenable. They cannot show that their 
win vindicated any rights but their own. Their suit created no windfall to the advantage of 
other citizens, as the trial court found that 90% of the benefits of this litigation inured to the 
Plaintiffs. They have not marshaled the evidence supporting the trial court's factual 
findings and demonstrated that their inadequacy in supporting the trial court's decisions, 
thereby precluding appellate review. The restoration of the road does not even benefit any 
other citizens. 
Their third-party litigation claim is defective because it is not applicable against 
governmental entities. Moreover, they have failed to marshal the trial court's findings 
rejecting this theory of recovery and they have not shown that the trial court abused his 
discretion. This theory of recovery may not be used as Plaintiffs have attempted here to 
recover their litigation expenses from litigating against third parties but even from these 
Defendants and from litigating against their relatives. Therefore, their motion should be 
denied in its entirety. 
DATED this J a n u a r y , 2007. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON ; 
and ] 
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY ] 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE ] 
COUNTY, J.D. JOHNSON, in ; 
his capacity as Director of ) 
Development Services for Salt Lake ) 
County; THE CITY OF MID VALE, a ] 
body politic; and MARK McGRATH, in ] 
his official capacity as Planning ] 
Director for Midvale City, ] 
Defendants. ) 
> CORRECTED AMENDED 
) COMPLAINT 
> Civil No. 950905166AA 
) Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiffs, for their cause of action against defendants, allege as follows: 
1. That they are fee owners of homes and real property located in unincorporated 
Salt Lake County with the addresses of 1072 East North Union Avenue and 1078 East North 
Union Avenue. 
2. That North Union Avenue is the sole access and easement to these properties and 
has been so since the parcels were platted in approximately 1857. A copy of the 1857 plat is 
attached as Exhibit "A". Plaintiffs' property consists of Lots 3-6 and 19-22, marked with an 
"X". 
3. That all or part of the public right-of-way located to the south of parcels 3-6 has 
been vacated or abandoned by Salt Lake County. 
4. That on or about April 12, 1994, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
approved a site plan for Hermes Associates to build a shopping center around plaintiffs property 
(Exhibit "B"). 
5. That defendant Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County is the 
governing body of Salt Lake County. 
6. That defendant J.D. Johnson is the current Director of Development Services for 
Salt Lake County and the officer responsible for enforcing the requirements of the uniform 
Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake County. 
7. That effective January 1, 1998, defendant City of Midvale annexed a portion of 
unincorporated Salt Lake County that includes plaintiffs' property and the shopping center 
surrounding it. 
[meibos^ dmend-com 2ac] - 2 -
8. That defendant Mark McGrath is the current planning director for the City of 
Midvale and is responsible for ensuring that property situated within the jurisdiction of the City 
of Midvale complies with applicable planning and zoning statutes, and regulations. 
9. That on July 28, 1994, Development Services issued a Conditional Use Permit 
to Hermes Associates for the construction of this shopping center. (Exhibit "C"). 
10. That on August 10, 1994, the Salt Lake County Commission signed an ordinance 
vacating North Union Avenue between 1000 East and 1300 East, except for the portion to the 
north of plaintiffs' property. This ordinance also created a 25-foot public right-of-way to the 
west of plaintiffs' property. This street is now known as 1070 East. (Exhibit "D"). 
11. That 1070 East and North Union Avenue in front of plaintiff's property do not 
meet the minimum standards established by Salt Lake County's Roadway Standards and the 
Uniform Zoning Ordinance. That this road does not provide plaintiffs with adequate and 
reasonable access to their property. 
12. That the building shown on the site plan as Retail 3 has not been built in 
compliance with the minimum standards required by the Uniform Zoning Ordinance and with 
the express terms of its Conditional Use Permit. That this same building has been built on top 
of the public right-or-way established for 1070 East. 
13. That the building shown on the site plan as Retail 2 has not been built in 
compliance with the minimum standards required by the Uniform Zoning Ordinance and with 
the express terms of its Conditional Use Permit. 
[meibos\amend-com 2ac] - 3 -
1A
 That on June 21. 1995, the Salt Lake County Commission voted to grant Hermes 
v* tt.1. xmi ;h, Kidw ay standards for 1070 East and North Union Avenue as they 
access plaintiffs' property. (Exhibits "E" arid "F"). 
V rf IER EFOR E, I Plaintiffs pray f :)i: ji I igmei it as f ::>1.1 c: • ;\ s : 
rha t the exemptions granted to Hermes Associates be declared arbitrary, 
capricious una n , . . . . 
I ha t any and all building permits, certificates of occupancy or other licenses and 
permits issued to, for or regarding the buildings shown as Retail 2 and Retail 3 be declared null 
That the Court grant plaintiffs a hearing for a determination as to what constitutes 
iLa.M , te access to plaintiffs' proper 1:> 
vd\ \ Judgment be issued requiring the Count) to provide plaintiffs with access 
to their property which meets the requirements established A\J L ^ : m-j. jquchieu HCILI.: . 
DATED this 3 ' day of March, 1998. 
P A R R WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorney! tor Plaintiffs 
[meibos\amend- c: o t n, 2 a c J 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ • •< ui Mdi\.ii, 1998 a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing CORRECTED AMENDED COMPLAINT was served via hand-delivery to the 
parties set forth below: 
Patrick F. Holden, Esq. 
Deputy County Attorney 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Jay D. Gurmankin, Esq. 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Dale F. Gardiner 
O'RORKE & GARDINER. 
6965 Union Park Ctr. #450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
• i i E 
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Deputy District Attorneys 
2001 South State Street, #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3421 
Facsimile: (801) 468-2622 
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Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County and Ken Jones 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN - 5 2006 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
By. m Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON and 
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS 
Plaintiffs, 
ORDER DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY and KEN JONES, as Director o: 
Development Services for Salt Lake Countv 
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
FORT UNION ASSOCIATES, L.C., a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, and 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Utah 
Limited Partnership 
Third Party-Defendants 
Civil No. 950905166AA 
Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN 
PAGh 1(0 i 
The above-entitled civil action came on regularly for oral argument on May 12, 2006 at 
10:a it. i I. : n tl le foil : ni lg i i I : ti : i is: (1) I 'laintiffs' Motion foi \ ttomey Fees,, Costs arid I itigati :)i i 
Expenses (filed March 10, 2006), and (2) defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portion of 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts (filed March _ ;, JUU ;. Appearing and arguing on behaii * ; i;ie 
plaintiffs were their attorneys Jeffrey Hunt and David Reymann of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
Loveless. Appearing and arguing on behalf of the defendants were TJ. Tsakalos and Donald H. 
oral argument, the court had reviewed all the memoranda submitted by the parties' counsel, the cases 
cited therein, and selected portions of the exhibits attached thereto. 
Based upon the arguments, memoranda and authorities presented by the parties and their 
counsel, and finding good cause therefor, the court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows: 
1. ' 1" * itl: II espect to Plaintiffs' ft lotion •• ' ^vv ;' vs. osts and I itigati :)ii 
Expenses, there is no applicable statute or contractual provision which expressly 
permits the award of fees to the plaintiffs herein. 
2. With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party lit w . m 
rule," the court finds that the rule recognizes that attorney fees may be a measure of 
danKuvv : >• • • vr'>cv; !~v^  * c 
found within the court's inherent equitable authority. 
3. rmiiK-i UA o v i !;;K! V ••-.:, was no "common :ui;d ^ -ate*/. ?,\ piamtills' 
action in this case from which attorney fees can or should be paid. 
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fees asserted by plaintiffs in their complaint herein as amended to date. 
5. With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private attorney 
general doctrine," in order to grant an award of attorney fees and costs under that 
doctrine, the court must first determine whether the plaintiffs' legal action, and the 
specific relief secured as a result of the plaintiffs' action, primarily benefitted the 
plaintiffs individually or, rather, primarily benefitted the public at large. 
6. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," that doctrine is not intended to extend the exception to the 
American rule - which rule restricts awards of attorney fees in civil ligation to cases 
where such an award is expressly authorized by contract or statute - to any case in 
which a citizen's legal action effectively restrains an unreasonable exercise of 
governmental power, even though such a legal action may incidentally result in a 
general, indirect benefit to the public at large. 
7. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation sought and 
obtained relief for their "special private injury," not for vindication of a broad public 
interest. 
8. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," in analyzing whether the individual plaintiffs, as opposed 
to the general public, primarily benefitted from the prosecution of this action by the 
plaintiffs, the Court finds here that plaintiffs as individuals primarily benefitted from 
the relief they secured, and not the general public. Specifically, the court concludes 
- PAGE 3 OF 5 -
that approximately ninety percent (90%) of the benefit of the relief obtained inured 
to the plaintiffs as individuals, while approximately ten percent (10%) of the benefit 
may have inured to the general public. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to meet their 
burden under the private attorney general doctrine of showing that the public at large 
primarily benefitted from the plaintiffs' prosecution of this action. 
9. Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' Statement of 
Facts is denied. 
THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees, Costs and Litigation Expenses is 
DENIED. 
2. Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' 
Statement of Facts is DENIED. 
DATED this C day of / ^ ^ ^ ^ 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
l O M ^ Q U I N N ., / ^ 
District ( # t o j u ^ 
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David P. Williams, Esq. 
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Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MAY 12, 2006 
2 JUDGE ANTHONY B. QUINN PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Let'S go on the record in the matter of 
5 Culbertson vs. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake. 
6 Please state your appearances. 
7 MR. HUNT: Good morning Your Honor, Jeff Hunt and 
8 David Reymann for the plaintiffs. 
9 MR. TSAKALOS: T. J. Tsakalos for the County, Your 
10 Honor and with me is Don Hansen. 
11 THE COURT: All right. We're here today on the 
12 plaintiff s Motion to Awarded Attorney's fees and costs 
13 associated really with both this action and the action that was 
14 consolidated against Hermes, at least for purposes of appeal. 
15 I have read all the memos that have been submitted with respect 
16 to this motion. I've read most of the cases. I've read 
17 selectively from the exhibits. I'm going to tell you what my 
18 tentative views are and then give you a chance to respond. 
19 I guess I start with two propositions that in my mind 
20 set forth the dilemma that I face as a judge in this case. 
21 First is a sense of almost outrage at the County's conduct in 
22 this case which the Supreme Court of Utah had characterized as 
23 a willful, deliberate violation of the law. Despite being 
24 placed on notice for years that their conduct was in violation 
25 of the law, their insistence on going forward with providing 
1 
1 exceptions to the law for the purposes of allowing this 
2 development to go forward is really, really troubling. 
3 The second proposition is that I take a conservative 
4 view of my power as a district court judge and struggle to find 
5 an exception to the general rule that unless provided for by 
6 contract or statute, that I don't have the authority to grant 
7 attorney's fees to prevailing party in civil litigation. 
8 The first theory that's advanced that would allow me 
9 to grant attorney's fees in this case is the Private Attorney 
10 General Exception and I really don't find that particularly 
11 applicable to the facts in this case because I believe that the 
12 specific results obtained in this case primarily benefitted the 
13 plaintiffs and not the public as a whole. I accept the general 
14 proposition that whenever the power of government is restrained 
15 by the acts of its citizens and brought in conformance with the 
16 law, that every member of the public benefits to some degree 
17 but I don't believe that the Private Attorney General Exception 
18 is intended to extend to all those situations where the power 
19 of government is restrained by civil litigation filed on behalf 
20 of particular plaintiffs. If it included all of those 
21 situations, then the dog license analogy advanced by the County 
22 would be an apt analogy because if, contrary to law, a dog 
23 licese were granted or denied, that would be as arbitrary a use 
24 of government power as that which we are seeing in this case 
25 and there's a public interest in that not happening and it 
1 relates to the safety of the public because a dog license 
2 insures that rabies vaccinations occur and other things and so 
3 to some extent, every member of the public would benefit by the 
4 restraint of government power in that case. But there has to 
5 be a way to draw a line so that not every case where the law is 
6 vindicated in an action against a governmental agency, 
7 attorney's fees are awarded and I think that the line that has 
8 been drawn by the Supreme Court in the Stewart case with 
9 respect to the Private Attorney General Exception is you look 
10 to the specific relief obtained and you determine whether that 
11 specific relief benefitted the public as a whole or whether the 
12 benefit was primarily for the benefit of those individual 
13 plaintiffs. 
14 Interestingly, plaintiffs in this case succeeded in 
15 getting an injunction in the Hermes action and took the 
16 position in that case that they suffered a special private 
17 injury. If you look at the Johnson case which I've got here 
18 someplace. This is on page 4, at least of the Lexus, it looks 
19 like it's Page 14 of the Pacific Report. The Supreme Court 
20 states in that case, "We have defined special damages in the 
21 context of zoning violation of damage over and above the public 
22 injury which may be caused by the violation of the zoning 
23 ordinance. The damages need only different kind or be 
24 substantially more than those of the general community. As the 
25 I only landowner surrounded on three sides by Hermes expansion 
1 Appellees have obviously suffered a different and more 
2 substantial impact than any other landowners near the Family 
3 Center. The record unequivocally reflects the fact that 
4 Appellees are the only homeowners whose residential property is 
5 within feet of the shopping center and who have been affected 
6 in kind by Hermes' substandard roadway construction and non-
7 compliance." Well, it goes on but at the plaintiff's urging, 
8 the Supreme Court makes a finding of specific and discreet 
9 injury to these plaintiffs as opposed to the public at large as 
10 a condition to approving injunctive relief in this case which, 
11 it's not a mirror image of the issue that I'm facing but it's 
12 close because I would have to find in order to grant attorney's 
13 fees that the specific relief - this is my view of the law, 
14 that the specific relief obtained in this case benefitted the 
15 public as a whole virtually to the same extent as they did the 
16 plaintiffs in this case and for that reason I don't think that 
17 Private Attorney General Exception applies. 
18 Secondly, with respect to the third party litigation 
19 section, that is not a reflection of the Court's equitable 
20 power to grant attorney's fees to a prevailing party in limited 
21 circumstances. That is simply a measure of damage that has 
22 been recognized in limited circumstances whereas one of the 
23 items of damage that a plaintiff may obtain, he can obtain the 
24 I costs of pursuing litigation against a third party if it's 
25 proximately caused by the negligent act of another or if it's, 
1 in the contract section, it's a consequential damage of the 
2 breach of contract or another. I don't think this case, number 
3 one, fits into that but even more importantly, having checked 
4 the complaint in this case, the corrected amended complaint 
5 which I believe is the most recent complaint filed, no claim 
6 for damages at all. So I can't simply award - this is a damage 
7 claim and I can't award damages where none were prayed in the 
8 complaint. So anyway, that's my tentative assessment. 
9 Mr. Hunt, I'll give you a chance to demonstrate the 
10 error of my analysis. 
11 MR. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor. I want to thank 
12 you for your comments. It will help focus my argument. I 
13 neglected to introduce my client, Pearl Mybois, who is in court 
14 today as well and seated to her right is her father, Blaine 
15 Johnson as well and I wanted to introduce them to the Court. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. It's nice to have them here. 
17 MR. HUNT: Your Honor, also I may make reference to 
18 two demonstrative exhibits which are m the record, have been 
19 admitted in this case and I'd like to turn those around if I 
20 may. 
21 THE COURT: Of course. 
22 MR. HUNT: I've shown these to counsel prior to Your 
23 Honor coming on the bench. Just to introduce the exhibits, 
24 this is the plat that was attached to the Conditional Use 
25 Permit that the County issued to Hermes to construct the 
1 I shopping center addition. So what this does is depicts the 
2 roadways and the Croxford property in relation to the shopping 
3 center development. The Croxford property is identified there, 
4 shaded in yellow, 1070 E. Street which the Supreme Court found 
5 was a public street is right here abutting the west and North 
6 Union Avenue which the Supreme Court found is a public street 
7 abuts to the north of the property. So these are the roadways 
8 and the property to give Your Honor a visual depiction and then 
9 this, of course, is a photograph taken by Pearl Mybois at 
10 approximately 1999 after the construction had occurred in a 
11 photograph, before the construction had occurred and you can 
12 see here what the problem was here building the shopping center 
13 directly on the roadway with no setbacks, sidewalks, which the 
14 Supreme Court found was illegal. 
15 I'd like to focus on the Private Attorney General 
16 Doctrine and that specific requirement that Your Honor has 
17 honed in on which I agree is at the heart of our motion and 
18 which I'd like an opportunity to try to change Your Honor's 
19 mind on. This was outrageous conduct engaged in by the County 
20 and Hermes which the Court in a very unusual opinion strongly 
21 condemned in the Hermes and Culbertson opinions and I would 
22 submit to Your Honor that even taking a conservative view of 
23 Your Honor's powers, it's clear under the Stewart case that you 
24 do have inherent equitable power to make an award of attorney's 
25 fees and costs when you deem appropriate in the interests of 
1 justice and equity. Those are the words of the Supreme Court 
2 in the Stewart case and they went on in that case to say, one 
3 of the ways you can do that is the Private Attorney General 
4 Doctrine where in essence the plaintiff, the litigant has to 
5 take on the role of the attorney general to obtain enforcement 
6 of the laws and that's exactly the case that we have here, Your 
7 Honor. 
8 My clients did everything within their power to get 
9 Salt Lake County to enforce the law in this case. This was not 
10 a case like a dog license or a challenge of a refusal to issue 
11 a dog license or even a challenge, as the County makes argument 
12 in their brief, of the issuance of the CUP, the Conditional Use 
13 Permit. We never challenged that. We never said, County, 
14 don't issue the CUP. We never said, County, don't approve the 
15 development. We never said, don't issue the dog license. That 
16 is not the analogy to this case. What my client said is first 
17 of all, if you're going to build the shopping center addition, 
18 you can't do it with tax subsidies and they took that case to 
19 the Utah Supreme Court and won. They invalidated the RDA and 
20 there was a ruling that tax subsidies could not be used for the 
21 shopping center expansion. After that they went ahead with the 
22 development, bought out all of the homeowners adjacent to the 
23 development with the exception of one, my clients. The 
24 descendants of the Croxford and Griffiths family who have been 
25 living on this property for 100 years refused to sell. So what 
1 did they do? The enveloped the property on three sides with 
2 commercial buildings, 200,000 square feet of commercial 
3 buildings, in excess of 25 feet just literally casting a shadow 
4 over the property because they built it right on the road. 
5 Before they did that, before the County allowed them 
6 to do that, my clients said, County, we understand that they 
7 I can build their shopping center addition but they need to obey 
8 the laws. They need to obey the zoning and roadway ordinances 
9 that are in effect. I think that's what distinguishes this 
10 case. This is a case where we have, and this is what makes it 
11 a more general application. All property owners that are 
12 impacted by development in this state including this county 
13 should have the right to rely on the government authority that 
14 has enforcement power to protect their rights, to protect their 
15 rights with respect to that development, to make sure that it 
16 complies with the existing public safety laws which are 
17 intended to benefit not just the property owners that live 
18 right next to it, but everybody, everybody that is in the 
19 jurisdiction of those ordinances and laws has the benefit of 
20 them and that's all my clients did. They said, County, do not 
21 allow them to build their buildings on the roadway without the 
22 setbacks, without the sidewalks, without the legally required 
23 width, without the legally required turning radius. That's 
24 illegal. Stop them. And the County said no. They not only 
25 said no, after they tore out the road, they went in and tried 
1 to fix it with their after-the-fact exceptions to the roadway 
2 ordinance which the Supreme Court condemned. 
3 And my argument to Your Honor is simply that there is 
4 a broader public policy at issue here in allowing residents to 
5 rely on the government authority that has enforcement 
6 responsibility to do their job and in this case, they didn't do 
7 their job and why didn't they do their job? One of the reasons 
8 we submit is because they sought contractual indemnification 
9 from the party that they were suppose to enforce those 
10 ordinances against and — 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Hunt, let me focus you on what I 
12 think is missing in this case because like I said before, I 
13 think whenever citizens take action to check unreasonable use 
14 of government power, we all benefit. If they had, as the 
15 specific relief that they had obtained in this case - and I'm 
16 not saying that it would have been a relief that's available or 
17 that would have been a good injunction, but if they had gotten 
18 an injunction saying that the County may never again approve a 
19 development without appropriate setbacks and roadways that 
20 comply with law, that's a good argument for application of 
21 Private Attorney General Exception but the specific relief they 
22 got in this case really only benefits them as owners of the 
23 property. That's where I'm trying to draw the line. 
24 MR. HUNT: Sure, and I'd like to suggest that the 
25 impact was broader than that and here's why. After we get 
1 these roads reconfigured after Hermes complies with the Court's 
2 injunction, we're going to have roadways that are of legal 
3 width with the legal turning radius here and a legal turnaround 
4 here with setbacks and side blocks and if you look at the 
5 benefit, every member of the public - these are public roads. 
6 They tried to argue they were private roads but they're not. 
7 The Supreme Court said these are public roads. Every member of 
8 the public that drives along these roadways, every emergency 
9 personnel that uses those roadways, sanitation, snowplow 
10 drivers, ambulances will be able to have access that is on 
11 legally required roads with legal turnarounds and legal widths, 
12 legal setbacks. It's obviously much safer for members of the 
13 public to walk on sidewalks than it is on the middle of the 
14 road. 
15 Now, you may say well, but it's a dead-end street, 
16 the only people that go down there would be people that have an 
17 interest in going to this property. That's not quite true. 
18 We've got commercial buildings here that have access for the 
19 loading docks and a trash compacting facility. So we have 
20 vehicles that use that. There's a safety interest in the 
21 public at large in making sure that those vehicles travel on 
22 roadways that are safe and in fact, Your Honor, this inures to 
23 the benefit of every single family that is going to live on 
24 this property in the future. Right now it's my client's, 
25 | that's true, that as the Court said, they were the ones that 
10 
1 were disproportionally impacted by the violation but there are 
2 going to be other families living on that property. Right now 
3 it's Elama Culbertson. She's lived there for 25 years. She 
4 moved there in 1981 to care for her 80-year old grandparents 
5 who were living on the homestead. But there are going to be 
6 other families there and people that travel along that roadway, 
7 those public streets are all going to benefit, every member of 
8 the public. These are public roads that every member of the 
9 public has the right to travel and I think that the safety 
10 illustration, the safety issue with those streets was 
11 illustrated just last month when there was an individual who 
12 called for 911 on the property and because of the 
13 configuration, illegal reconfiguration of these roads, couldn't 
14 find the property, got there too late and the individual died. 
15 It was covered in the newspapers last month. That's just a 
16 dramatic illustration of the unsafe condition of these roadways 
17 and because of the relief that my client sought, not just sort 
18 of the general policy, I mean, there's different levels of 
19 generality, you're right, that you can look at this. You can 
20 look at it in terms of enforcing the laws generally when an 
21 entity has been put on notice they're violating them, whether 
22 that indicate an important social policy, but also at a more 
23 micro level, the specific relief here is going to benefit all 
24 I members of the public, all future people who live on that 
25 property and you can't, you know, who knows where these road 
11 
are going to go eventually? But when they are extended if they 
ever are, they're going to be the legally required widths and 
turning radius, etc., that comply with the ordinances. 
And I think to address Your Honor's point about the 
special damage and the Supreme Court opinion in Culbertson, I 
thought about that and I think it's important to draw the 
distinction between what the Court was talking about there and 
what we're talking about here. The Court was talking about the 
special damages that my clients were required to prove to have 
standing. It was a standing analysis, in order to get the 
injunctive relief that we were requesting and what the Court 
said was, we want to appropriately narrow the class of people 
that are entitled to that type of relief and if you're out 
somewhere else in the county, you shouldn't be able to come in 
say Hermes ought to tear their illegally constructed buildings 
down. You need to have some kind of special injury to yourself 
over and above the general public and we obviously do. We're 
not denying that, that we're impacted in a way that is more 
severe than the general public, but I don't think that is 
necessarily the same thing as saying that the public is not 
deriving a benefit by the relief that we obtained in this case. 
I don't think that's the same thing. If that were the case, 
then every time a party was entitled to injunctive relief, 
mandatory injunctive relief to require buildings to be torn 
down, to remedy a violation of the zoning ordinance, you'd 
12 
1 never be entitled to attorney's fees under the Private Attorney 
2 General Doctrine and I think that's a harsh, inequitable 
3 result. I don't think that was the result that the Court 
4 intended in Stewart and I don't think that they, frankly were 
5 thinking about this particular case in Stewart but it is an 
6 extraordinary case and they did say it takes the extraordinary 
7 case and the Shipman case later, they say it takes the 
8 extraordinary case. And my argument that it is extraordinary 
9 but in a different way. You're right, it didn't create a fund 
10 that's going to benefit a large group of people. It didn't 
11 create a law or a rule of the court that says that all 
12 government entities need to comply with their zoning laws but I 
13 think that they didn't say that because it's self-evident. I 
14 mean, the government entities are charged with enforcing the 
15 law and in this case they were put on notice that they weren't 
16 doing that and they went ahead anyway. They went forward 
17 anyway. For 10 years we had to fight them to finally get to 
18 the place where we should have been in 1995 and I think that 
19 that process of saying that not just the developers but as Mr. 
20 Horouchi called them in his opinion column in the Tribune that 
21 small groups of people, he called us a small group of people 
22 that were sacrificed for the good of the taxpayers. Small 
23 groups of people are entitled to the benefit of the law too, 
24 not just developers that indemnify the County against risks 
25 I like this lawsuit which by the way County has filed as Your 
13 
1 Honor probably know, a third party complaint against Hermes 
2 under that indemnification provision saying if the Court awards 
3 any fees, those fees should be paid by Hermes, pursuant to that 
4 contractual indemnification and I think there is a public 
5 policy in vindicating that aspect of the case, that a County 
6 simply can't abdicate its enforcement authority to a private 
7 developer and say, you know, if it all shakes out bad, you guys 
8 are on the hook. There ought to be a policy which I think was 
9 vindicated in this case and would be with an award of fees that 
10 the County needs to take responsibility for its illegal actions 
11 and this isn't a discretionary call by the County that we're 
12 challenging. It's not like they made a zoning decision and the 
13 court determined it was arbitrary and capricious and overturned 
14 it. That's not this case. This case is, yeah, you can build 
15 your shopping center but, you know, you can't squeeze these 
16 people like you did. You can't envelope them like you did in 
17 violation of the existing laws and that's what we think is the 
18 public policy that we've vindicated. It can't be - we think 
19 it's inequitable to say that just because it's a dead end 
20 street that we don't qualify for the Private Attorney General 
21 Doctrine in the award of fees in this case. I mean, I guess 
22 that's one way you could look at it if the street went through, 
23 more cars would be going along it. I don't think that that's 
24 the relevant fact, at least that's what we would suggest to 
25 Your Honor. It's the fact that it's a public road, it's a 
14 
1 public right-of-way/ public sidewalks and every member of the 
2 public once those are constructed will have the benefit of 
3 safer streets and safer sidewalks and safer access for the 
4 emergency personnel and that public safety is recognized in 
5 Salt Lake County's own ordinance which is the ordinance that we 
6 vindicated in this case, the safety from fire and other 
7 dangers, adequate light and air, protection of the urban 
8 environment. 
9 So I understand Your Honor's concern. It is the 
10 concern with the application in this case but I think if you 
11 look at it both on the broader policy level and then the 
12 specific results that we obtained here, not just for our 
13 clients but for every member of the public, we qualify under 
14 the Private Attorney General Doctrine for recovery of fees and 
15 this isn't a far fetched notion. We cited the Court to the 
16 other cases in California that have applied the doctrine in 
17 this context and the — 
18 THE COURT: They have a specific statute in 
19 California that's broad enough to cover land use decisions 
20 which we are lacking here in Utah. 
21 MR. HUNT: I would just argue by analogy that the 
22 Court in Stewart did rely heavily on the Cerono decision in 
23 California for recognition of the doctrine and the other 
24 California cases we cited did apply it in the context of zoning 
25 violations and ordinance violations. 
15 
1 So, you know, I don't think it's the dog license 
2 case. This is a truly extraordinary situation where you had 
3 the entity that was responsible for" protecting the public 
4 including my clients, refusing to enforce the law after being 
5 put on notice and then trying to fix it with their after-the-
6 fact exceptions. There's an interest in vindicating a result 
7 that condemns that kind of conduct that says, you know, that 
8 kind of conduct won't be tolerated. These people have rights 
9 too and everybody that lives next to shopping centers or 
10 commercial developments have rights that need to be protected. 
11 We think we've indicated that interest in this case and we've 
12 indicated the more practical public safety, health and safety 
13 interest of driving on safe roadways. 
14 And just finally, Your Honor, just to touch on sort 
15 of the balancing points here, weighing my client's personal 
16 gain here versus the cost that they incurred in prosecuting 
17 this litigation. They're not getting any pecuniary benefit. 
18 The only thing that they ever wanted was compliance with the 
19 law. They wanted a road that was legally as wide as it should 
20 have been with legally required setbacks with some landscaping, 
21 sidewalk, the turning radius that should have been in the cul-
22 de-sac. And now we're going to get that as a result of the 
23 Hermes litigation which we were - they were a necessary part. 
24 We had to sue Hermes to get this relief and that's why we think 
25 [ we're entitled for the Hermes fees as well under the equitable 
16 
1 theory. This isn't a result that's benefitting my clients 
2 financially. It's just merely getting compliance with the law. 
3 And, Your Honor, finally, I would just submit that 
4 the Court does have legal authority to award this remedy if you 
5 determine that it's proper under the analysis, the Private 
6 Attorney General Doctrine analysis and in thinking about that, 
7 it really is an equitable remedy and if you think about who 
8 should bear the financial consequences of the County's illegal 
9 conduct in this case, should it be the homeowners who did 
10 everything that they could for 10 years to get the County to 
11 stop and to get the County to enforce the law or should it be 
12 the County who should have undertaken that duty in the first 
13 place? We'd just simply submit if you weigh those choices, 
14 that justice and equity argue for an award in this case. Thank 
15 you. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hunt. I'll hear from the 
17 County. 
18 MR. TSAKALOS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try to be 
19 brief. The plaintiffs have prevailed in this case and I don't 
20 have a problem with that. I congratulate them but I need to 
21 put this in prospective. Counsel has been involved in 
22 litigation and maybe they're so personally involved they don't 
23 see things. The first time I became involved on this case was 
24 about two, two and a half months ago when they filed their 
25 motion for fees and the first thing I did was start scratching 
17 
my head and the next thing I did is I read the cases and I know 
your concern about what transpired here but I think we need to 
look at what the Supreme Court said in particular. We are not 
Hermes even though the way the plaintiffs have approached this 
motion before you is to put us all in the same basket. The 
Supreme Court didn't go there. What the Supreme Court said was 
that the district court judge who found our actions proper made 
a mistake. He was erroneous. It also said on Culbertson One 
that the plaintiffs contest the court's interpretation. It 
held in Culbertson 1 at paragraph 42, "We conclude the Judge's, 
and Ken Jones' decisions were erroneous." They used the term 
again regarding the 1070 East Street. The roadway standards 
that were applied, the plaintiffs contend that the exception 
was erroneous. That's at paragraph 48. The Court, "We 
conclude the exceptions were erroneously granted." This is as 
to the County. The court did say, "Hermes acted willfully and 
deliberately" at paragraph 56 but in its conclusion and the 
record, the record says, we made a mistake that's been 
rectified. 
Even in the Johnson vs. Hermes which is the 
Culbertson Two case, the Court again says the County's decision 
was erroneous. We made a mistake. So I think the Court can 
take some comfort in what the Supreme Court actually found in 
this matter in terms of our activities and in terms of issuing 
and approving this project. 
Now, on the Private Attorney General theory, I think 
counsel has a problem when I look at their reply brief at page 
7 to 9, I raised the defense that this was a discretionary 
action, that we were entitled to immunity and at page 7 to 9 
they take the argument, it wasn't discretionary because this is 
not affecting basic governmental policymaking just as the Court 
focused in its opening statements. I know they're trying to 
stretch this Private Attorney General theory and I just don't 
see how it can get there because as I pointed out, I know my 
dog analogy was simple but it would apply to a setback if we 
decide a 20 foot setback is required, the landowner says 18 is 
sufficient and the Court finds 19, we've got a fee driven 
lawsuit going on. It can be anything as simple as what kind of 
plywood is put into a project. We say 3/4 inch, the developer 
says half inch, we have a lawsuit and attorney's fees are going 
to drive these kinds of cases just like they do in the civil 
rights arena. This was not brought as a civil rights case. 
It's brought backwards from a 2001 decision until today asking 
for a very large sum of money involving the - I'd like to point 
out to the Court, not only the action against the County, the 
action against Hermes, but the action against a relative that 
was involved here. I think it was the Croxfords. I don't know 
the case as well as the Court or these folks but I saw three 
cases and three fees that they're asking for here. 
I want to touch a little bit on this Private Attorney 
19 
General theory. The Supreme Court in Stewart relied on the 
Sorano decision and as the Court pointed out, that California 
cases have been codified on the Private Attorney General 
theory. The cases I cited to the court show it's basically a 
disfavored approach. Very few if any of the courts have 
accepted at Private Attorney General theory in general let 
along against a governmental entity. Even on remand of the 
public service - back to the Public Service Commission in the 
Private Attorney General theory under Barker vs. Public Service 
Commission, the court did not go off on the Private Attorney 
General theory. It went off on the common fund that the action 
of the few rate payers created a multi-million dollar — 
THE COURT: But they said that even if it wasn't 
enough, even if the common fund wasn't enough that they were 
entitled to recover attorney's fees under the Private Attorney 
General theory. 
MR. TSAKALOS: But they made the award there and 
there's no Utah case that goes the opposite direction that 
actually has awarded under the Private Attorney General theory. 
As a matter of fact, both the parties in this case have cited 
the Utahns for Better Dental Health out of Davis County on the 
fluoride cases. Judge Dawson denied them attorney's fees that 
they sought under this Private AG theory. It was remanded and 
in February he issued his other opinion on the remand, again 
denying the Private Attorney General theory and in that 
20 
1 I particular case, we have health issues involved for literally 
2 thousands and thousands of residents in Davis County and the 
3 judge found that that did not transcend the personal interests 
4 of these particular plaintiffs who brought the action. That 
5 was not sufficient to give them an award of fees and in here, 
6 no matter how you want to argue it, there are two folks that 
7 benefitted from this decision and that's what they sought and 
8 that's what they got. I don't think I can belabor it any more 
9 than that. 
10 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Hunt? 
11 MR. HUNT: Just briefly, Your Honor on the argument 
12 that we're not Hermes, the record is clear that they acted hand 
13 in hand with Hermes throughout this entire process. They got 
14 the contractual indemnification from Hermes, they acceded to 
15 all of Hermes demands and this is what we ended up with. The 
16 court in Culbertson One did condemn the County. 
17 THE COURT: That's certainly the way I read it. 
18 MR. HUNT: Not just Hermes and I don't need to read 
19 the language but it's in paragraph 56 and they said that the 
20 County should be condemned for violating its own ordinances in 
21 this case. 
22 Your Honor, we would just submit that justice and 
23 equity do argue in favor of an award in this case under the 
24 Private Attorney General Doctrine for all the reasons we've 
25 said. We don't think that this benefits just Elaina Culbertson 
21 
and Pearl Mybois. We think it vindicated the important side 
interest in being able to go to the enforcer of the laws and 
require that enforcer to enforce them. We had to undertake 
that duty ourselves in this case after we put them on notice. 
That's what makes this case extraordinary. This was not simply 
a mistake. This is not simply, we didn't know what you were 
claiming. They knew since 1995 and they did it anyway. That's 
why the Court condemned their conduct and that's the important 
societal interest that we claim is being vindicated, was 
vindicated in this case in addition to the fact that these are 
public roads and every member of the public from now into the 
future that travels on them will be traveling on roads that are 
safer because of the result in this case. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. If there were a doctrine 
either found in a statute or in an opinion that gave me 
authority to award attorney's fees if the County willfully 
violated its own ordinances, I would not hesitate to do that in 
this case; however, I remain unconvinced that this is a good 
case for application of the Private Attorney General's 
Exception to the general rule in Utah which is that I don't 
award attorney's fees to prevailing parties. And once again, 
the approach that I've taken is to look at the specific results 
obtained in the litigation and determine who benefitted 
primarily. Did the public primarily benefit or did these 
22 
1 private litigants primarily benefit? Stewart says, "Courts 
2 have awarded attorney's fees to a party as a Private Attorney 
3 General when vindication of a strong or society important 
4 public policy takes place and the necessary costs of doing so, 
5 transcends the individual's pecuniary interest to an extent 
6 requiring subsidation. Now there was no individual pecuniary 
7 interest in the sense of award of money damages but there was 
8 an individual interest pursued in this case in terms of 
9 improving access to a specific parcel of property and what I 
10 think that language requires me to do is look at the results 
11 and weigh and determine, you know, who ultimately benefitted 
12 from the specific results in this case? Was it these 
13 individual plaintiffs or was it the society as a whole? If it 
14 was even, then I think that - if it was at least even the 
15 Private Attorney General Exception would apply but if you have 
16 a situation where the interests vindicated on behalf of the 
17 individuals, whether pecuniary or not, but the specific results 
18 obtained, whether it benefitted them as compared to society as 
19 a whole, I think it's probably 90/10 in favor of the individual 
20 litigants in this case and because of that, I don't think that 
21 it's fair to say that they were out there representing the 
22 public as a whole and should be reimbursed their attorney's 
23 fees. I just view the exception more narrowly than you do, Mr. 
24 Hunt, even though this is a compelling case to do something to 
25 help out these individuals. I don't see it within my power so 
23 
I'm going to deny the Motion for Attorney's fees. I ask the 
County to prepare the order if you would please. 
MR. TSAKALOS: There's also a Motion to Strike. Do 
you want to make any order... 
THE COURT: In light of my decision, I don't think 
it's worth spending a lot of time on that. For purposes of 
your order I've denied the Motion to Strike because I think 
it's all things that I can consider in this kind of an 
equitable evaluation. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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Westlaw 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 1 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 2303808 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 402 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 2303808 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES 
BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT AND WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20050057-CA. 
Sept. 22, 2005. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 000904688. The 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder. 
John Walsh, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
David E. Yocom and Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, MCHUGH, and ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development 
Corporation (Butler) appeals the trial court's dismissal 
of its complaint. 
Butler filed its complaint against Salt Lake County (the 
County) in 2000, after the County denied Butler's 
application for a conditional use permit (CUP). The 
complaint alleged six causes of action, seeking 
monetary damages and the granting of the CUP. The 
trial court dismissed the first three causes of action in 
January 2003, determining that the claims were barred 
by governmental immunity under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. §g 63-30-1 to -38 
(1997V [FN 11 The trial court dismissed the remaining 
claims in December 2004 based on failure to prosecute. 
FN1. This chapter was repealed effective July 
1, 2004, and a new governmental immunity 
act was enacted. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
63-30d-101 to -904 (2004). The former Act 
controls this case. 
Butler asserts the trial court committed reversible error 
in its January 2003 order when it dismissed claims for 
failure to file a notice of claim and failure to file an 
undertaking. See id. § 63-30-12 (providing for notice of 
claim); § 63-30-19 (requiring an undertaking to be filed 
at the time a complaint is filed). However, the trial 
court did not dismiss the claims on those grounds. In its 
order, the trial court noted that Butler had complied 
with the notice requirements and that Butler had filed 
an undertaking, although untimely. The trial court then 
dismissed the claims based solely on governmental 
immunity. In sum, Butler's asserted error does not 
directly address the trial court's decision. 
Butler does not show that the trial court erred in 
concluding that governmental immunity applied. In 
determining whether immunity applies, Utah courts 
have "looked to whether the injury asserted 'arose out 
of conduct or a situation specifically described in one 
of the subparts of 63-30-10; if it did, then immunity is 
preserved." Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 
P.2d 1162,1166 (Utah 1993V Courts will reject claims 
that reflect "attempts to evade these statutory categories 
by recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury." 
Id. The theory of liability crafted by a plaintiff does not 
control. See id. 
Although couched as a contract-based declaratory 
action, the substance of the complaint seeks affirmative 
relief, not just the declaration of rights under a contract. 
The breach cause of action demands that the trial court 
grant the CUP and damages. It does not request the trial 
court to enforce the contract through specific 
performance or declare the standard to which Butler is 
entitled under the contract. The additional causes of 
action in the complaint, although supposedly based on 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported m P 3d Page 2 
Not Reported m P 3d, 2005 WL 2303808 (Utah App ), 2005 UT App 402 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 2303808 (Utah App.)) 
the same contract, go further afield fiom contiact lehef 
One seeks a review and reversal of the County's 
decision, the otheis assert violations of due piocess and 
civil rights rather than conti act-based actions The 
complaint as a whole demonstrates that the undeilying 
harm was the denial of the CUP 
Because the injury asserted aiose out of conduct or a 
situation specifically described in one of the subparts of 
Utah Code section 63-30-10, governmental immunity 
is preserved See Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10 Section 
63-30-10(3) expressly retains immunity foi any injury 
that "arises out of, in connection with, or results from 
the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any 
permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization " Id § 63-30-10(3) The demal of a CUP 
comes withm the scope of this section, retaining 
immunity for claims arising from the denial of a 
permit See id As a result, the trial court properly 
dismissed the causes of action based on governmental 
immunity 
*2 The remaining causes of action were dismissed in 
December 2004 for failure to prosecute Butler does not 
challenge that dismissal, but attempts to reach back to 
challenge prior rulings However, because the prior 
rulings did not provide the grounds for the actual final 
dismissal, Butler's aiguments are not on point Butler 
has not shown that the trial court erred m dismissing the 
remaining claims for failure to prosecute 
Accordingly, the dismissal of Butler's complaint is 
affirmed 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN - 5 2006 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DAVID E. YOCOM [USB #3581] 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DONALD H. HANSEN [USB #1332] 
T.J. TSAKALOS [USB # 3289] 
Deputy District Attorneys 
2001 South State Street, #S3700 - Deputy cierK 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3421 
Facsimile: (801) 468-2622 
Attorneys for Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs 
Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County and Ken Jones 
By- m 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON and 
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY and KEN JONES, as Director of 
Development Services for Salt Lake County, 
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
FORT UNION ASSOCIATES, L.C., a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, and 




PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
and 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
Civil No. 950905166AA 
Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN 
- PAGE 1 OF 5 -
The above-entitled civil action came on regularly for oral argument on May 12, 2006 at 
10:a.m. on the following motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Litigation 
Expenses (filed March 10,2006), and (2) defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portion of 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts (filed March 24, 2006). Appearing and arguing on behalf of the 
plaintiffs were their attorneys Jeffrey Hunt and David Reymann of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
Loveless. Appearing and arguing on behalf of the defendants were T.J. Tsakalos and Donald H. 
Hansen, Deputy District Attorneys of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. Prior to the 
oral argument, the court had reviewed all the memoranda submitted by the parties' counsel, the cases 
cited therein, and selected portions of the exhibits attached thereto. 
Based upon the arguments, memoranda and authorities presented by the parties and their 
counsel, and finding good cause therefor, the court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows: 
1. With respect to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees, Costs and Litigation 
Expenses, there is no applicable statute or contractual provision which expressly 
permits the award of fees to the plaintiffs herein. 
2. With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party litigation 
rule," the court finds that the rule recognizes that attorney fees may be a measure of 
damages, but the rule is not a substantive basis for awarding attorneys fees to be 
found within the court's inherent equitable authority. 
3. Further, the court finds that there was no "common fund" created by plaintiffs' 
action in this case from which attorney fees can or should be paid. 
4. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party 
litigation rule," the court finds that there was no claim for recovery of damages or 
-PAGE2OF 5-
fees asserted by plaintiffs in their complaint herein as amended to date. 
5. With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private attorney 
general doctrine," in order to grant an award of attorney fees and costs under that 
doctrine, the court must first determine whether the plaintiffs' legal action, and the 
specific relief secured as a result of the plaintiffs' action, primarily benefitted the 
plaintiffs individually or, rather, primarily benefitted the public at large. 
6. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," that doctrine is not intended to extend the exception to the 
American rule - which rule restricts awards of attorney fees in civil ligation to cases 
where such an award is expressly authorized by contract or statute - to any case in 
which a citizen's legal action effectively restrains an unreasonable exercise of 
governmental power, even though such a legal action may incidentally result in a 
general, indirect benefit to the public at large. 
7. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation sought and 
obtained relief for their "special private injury," not for vindication of a broad public 
interest. 
8. Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private 
attorney general doctrine," in analyzing whether the individual plaintiffs, as opposed 
to the general public, primarily benefitted from the prosecution of this action by the 
plaintiffs, the Court finds here that plaintiffs as individuals primarily benefitted from 
the relief they secured, and not the general public. Specifically, the court concludes 
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that approximately ninety percent (90%) of the benefit of the relief obtained inured 
to the plaintiffs as individuals, while approximately ten percent (10%) of the benefit 
may have inured to the general public. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to meet their 
burden under the private attorney general doctrine of showing that the public at large 
primarily benefitted from the plaintiffs' prosecution of this action. 
9. Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' Statement of 
Facts is denied. 
THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees, Costs and Litigation Expenses is 
DENIED. 
2. Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' 
Statement of Facts is DENIED. 
DATED this C ^ day of / ^ ^ ^ ^ 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS5 MOTION FOR 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS and DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
was duly served upon the following by U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid: 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. 
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq. 
David C. Reymann, Esq. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Mark O. Moms, Esq. 
David P. Williams, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
on this l ^ d a y o f \kh ,200^_. 
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